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The Contours of American Trade Secret Law:
What Is and What Isn't Protectable
as a Trade Secret
Richard F. Dole, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
New developments are refining the contours of what is protectable as a
trade secret. Both the Restatement of Unfair Competition and the Restate-
ment of Employment Law have concise formulations.' Alternative formula-
tions appear in the 1992 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),2
Annex IC of the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-which
deals with Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Law (TRIPs
Agreement) 3-and the proposed European Union Trade Secrets Directive.4
Finally, the 1996 Economic Espionage Act (EEA),5 a federal criminal statute,
uses over eighty words to define what is protectable as a trade secret.6
This article compares and reconciles these definitions with the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act (the Uniform Act),7 which was adopted in 1979 and offi-
* B.W. Young Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.
1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (AM. LAW INST.
1995) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION]; RESTATEMENT OF
EMP. LAW § 8.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF EMP.
LAW]. The importance of this new Restatement for trade secret litigation is
indicated by a statistical analysis of 394 cases in which a federal district court
issued a written opinion dealing with trade secrets between 1950 and 2008. In
over eighty-five percent of the cases the alleged misappropriator was either an
employee or a business partner of the plaintiff. David S. Almeling et al., A
Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in the Federal Courts, 45 GONZ.
L. REV. 291, 293, 303 (2010).
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex. art. 1711(1), Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA Agreement, art. 1711(1)].
3. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 39,
April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPs Agree-
ment, art. 39].
1. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and Business Information
(Trade Secrets) Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, Use and Disclosure, at 1,
COM (2013) 813 final (Apr. 2, 2013) [hereinafter Proposed EU Directive].
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2012).
6. Id. § 1839(3).
7. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-12 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529-659
(2005) [hereinafter UNIFORM ACT]. Judicial decisions under state enactments of
the Uniform Act will be identified in the footnotes.
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cially amended in 19858 by the Uniform Law Commission (ULC).9 The ULC
reports the Uniform Act as having been enacted in forty-seven states.' 0
II. BACKGROUND
The 1939 Restatement (First) of Torts discussed the definition of trade
secret in commentary rather than in black-letter text." Comment b. to § 757
described a trade secret as follows:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or com-
pilation of information which is used in one's business, and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical
compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving
materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of cus-
tomers. It differs from other secret information in a business . . . in
that it is not simply information as to single or ephemeral events
in the conduct of the business, as, for example, the amount or
8. Id. Four 1985 Amendments were adopted in response to issues raised by the
American Bar Association Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law.
See Action on Resolutions at the Annual Meeting in New Orleans, Louisiana-
August 1981, 1981 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK, & COPYRIGHT L. PROC.
30-31. The A.B.A. Section recommended amending § 2(b) to limit injunctions
allowing future use upon payment of a reasonable royalty to exceptional cir-
cumstances, amending § 3 to allow reasonable royalty damages if neither a
plaintiffs actual loss nor a defendant's unjust enrichment were provable,
amending § 7 to make clear that state remedies for breach of contract were not
preempted by the Uniform Act, and amending § 11 to clarify that the Uniform
Act did not apply to a continuing misappropriation that began prior to its effec-
tive date. Id. (Resolutions 206-3 to 206-6). The definition of trade secret was
not amended in 1985. Id.
9. The ULC was organized in 1892 to promote desirable and practicable uniform-
ity in state law. Commissioners are appointed by each state, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 7, at m-IV
(preface).
10. Legislative Fact Sheet - Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. LAW COMM., http://www.
uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=trade%20Secrets%2OAct (last
visited Aug. 29, 2016). The Act has yet to be adopted in Massachusetts, New
York, and North Carolina but has been enacted by the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Id. Widespread enactment of the Uni-
form Act has been described as a factor in the increasing importance of trade
secret law. David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increas-
ingly Important, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1091, 1106 (2012) ("[W]idespread
adoption of the UTSA has increased awareness of trade secret law-among
lawyers, companies, judges, and others-and has provided greater consistency
in the application of trade secret law and in the laws themselves.").
11. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
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other terms of a secret bid for a contract or the salary of certain
employees, or the security investments made or contemplated, or
the date fixed for the announcement of a new policy or for bring-
ing out a new model or the like. A trade secret is a process or
device for continuous use in the operation of the business . . . .
The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret.12
Comment b. identified six factors relevant to whether information was a
trade secret:
Some factors to be considered in determining whether given infor-
mation is one's trade secret are: (1) the extent to which the infor-
mation is known outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it
is known by employees and others involved in his business; (3)
the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the
information; (4) the value of the information to him and to his
competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him
in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with
which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by
others. 13
The plaintiff did not have to satisfy all six factors in order to establish exis-
tence of a trade secret.14
12. Id.
13. Id. The Restatement of Unfair Competition did not endorse the Restatement
(First) factors. See RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 1, § 39
cmt. d at 430 ("It is not possible to state precise criteria for determining the
existence of a trade secret. The status of information claimed as a trade secret
must be ascertained through a comparative evaluation of all the relevant fac-
tors, including the value, secrecy, and definiteness of the information as well as
the nature of the defendant's misconduct.").
14. Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. Playwood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir.
2003) (Illinois enactment) ("[W]e do not construe the foregoing factors as a
six-part test, in which the absence of evidence on any single factor necessarily
preludes a finding of trade secret protection."); accord IVS Hydro, Inc. v.
Robinson, 93 F. App'x. 521, 527 (4th Cir. 2004) (not selected for publication)
(West Virginia enactment). Wisconsin initially considered that all six Restate-
ment (First) factors had to be proved for a trade secret to exist. However, enact-
ment of the Uniform Act in Wisconsin transformed the Restatement (First)
factors from mandatory requirements into helpful guides. Minuteman, Inc. v.
Alexander, 434 N.W.2d 773, 778 (Wis. 1989) (Wisconsin enactment) ("We
hold that although all six elements of the Restatement's test are no longer re-
quired, the Restatement requirements still provide helpful guidance in deciding
whether certain materials are trade secrets under our new definition.").
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The Restatement (First) of Torts' description of trade secrets was the
basis for the definitions in the Uniform Actis and the Restatements of Unfair
Competition and Employment Law.16 Court decisions under the Uniform Act
frequently refer to the Restatement (First) of Torts.17 But to the extent that it
is inconsistent, the Uniform Act definition displaces the factors identified by
the Restatement (First) of Torts.18
IHI. THE UNIFORM ACT
The Uniform Act was developed to fill the gap created by the omission
of trade secrets from the Restatement (Second) of Torts.19 Section 1(4)
provides:
15. Richard F. Dole, Jr., Preemption of Other State Law by the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, 17 SMU Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 95, 97 (2014) ("The Uniform Act
. . . [elaborates] the common-law principles reflected in the 1939
Restatement.").
16. Both Restatements generally conformed their definitions to the Uniform Act,
which followed most of the principles of the Restatement (First). See RESTATE-
MENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 1, § 39, cmt. b at 427 ("The concept
of a trade secret as defined in this Section is intended to be consistent with the
definition of 'trade secret' in § 1(4) of the Act."); RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW,
supra note 1, § 8.02 cmt. a at 406 ("The definition of 'trade secret' in this
Section is consistent with the definition . . . of 'trade secret' used in the Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) . . . .").
17. E.g., MTG Guarnieri Mfg., Inc. v. Clouatre, 239 P.3d 202, 209-11 (Okla. App.
2010) (Oklahoma enactment) (applying both the Uniform Act definition of
trade secret and the Restatement (First) six factors).
18. In states that considered all the Restatement (First) factors to be required, en-
actment of the Uniform Act, for example, changes the factors into helpful
guides. E.g., Minuteman, Inc., 434 N.W.2d at 778 ("We hold that although all
six elements of the Restatement's test no longer are required, the Restatement
requirements still provide helpful guidance in deciding whether certain materi-
als are trade secrets under our new definition."). Contra Saforo & Assoc. v.
Porocel Corp., 991 S.W.2d 117, 120-122 (Ark. 1999) (Arkansas enactment)
(applying the Restatement (First) factors to determine whether a trade secret
existed under the Uniform Act). Saforo is criticized in Brandon B. Cate, Note,
Saforo & Assoc. v. Porocel Corp.: The Failure of the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act to Clarify the Doubtful and Confused Status of Common Law Trade Secret
Principles, 53 ARK. L. REV. 687, 716 (2000) ("[T]he avowed purpose of the
UTSA . . . is lost when courts ignore the statutory requirements . . . and rely
instead on displaced common law norms.").
19. Dole, supra note 15, at 97-8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, intro.
note (Am. LAW INST. 1979) (stating that trade secret law and tort law are inde-
pendent legal fields). Professor Robert Bone has proposed replacing the tradi-
tional trade secret law reflected in the Uniform Act with a regime limited to the
enforcement of contracts and traditional torts, perhaps combined with recogni-
tion of new property rights conditioned upon public disclosure of the informa-
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"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the cir-
cumstances to maintain its secrecy. 20
This definition omits the Restatement (First) of Torts' requirement that
a trade secret be "for continuous use."21 Under the Uniform Act, a trade se-
cret can exist before information has been commercialized.22 A so-called
negative trade secret can also exist in research proving that a particular ap-
proach will not work.23 Both the Restatement of Unfair Competition and the
tion that traditional trade secret law would protect only if kept secret. Robert G.
Bone, Exploring the Boundaries of Competitive Secrecy: An Essay on the Lim-
its of Trade Secret Law, in LAW, INFORMATION, AND INFORMATION TECHNOL-
OGY 99, 99 (Eli Lederman & Ron Shapira eds., 2001).
20. UNIFORM AcT, supra note 7, § 1(4), at 538.
21. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 757, cmt. b.
22. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 7, § 1, cmt. at 538; e.g., Learning Curve Toys, Inc.
v. Playwood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 716-20, 727, 730-31 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Illinois enactment) (jury verdict for toy designer against toy manufacturer re-
instated with respect to misappropriation of the plaintiff's design for noise-
producing toy train track that the plaintiff had not manufactured); Olson v.
Nieman's, Ltd., 579 N.W.2d 299, 303-04, 314 (Iowa 1998) (Iowa enactment)
(potential economic value of inventor's idea shown by evidence that it could be
sold to a manufacturer or patented). The Uniform Act's application to ideas
that have not been commercialized provides a remedy for idea submitters. See
Robert C. Denicola, The New Law of Ideas, 28 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 195,
198-03, 225-30, 236 (2014).
23. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 7, § 1, cmt. at 538; accord RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION, supra note 1, § 39, cmt. e (the rejected "use" requirement placed
"in doubt protection for so-called 'negative' information that teaches conduct
to be avoided . . ."). On-Line Techs., Inc. v. Perkin-Elmer Corp., 253 F. Supp.
2d 313, 323, 329-33 (D. Conn. 2003) (Connecticut enactment) (the plaintiff
alleged but failed to prove that the defendants' knowledge of plaintiffs
linearization method, servo control algorithm, and diode laser aided defend-
ants' development of different approaches). But see Amir H. Khoury, The Case
Against the Protection of Negative Trade Secrets: Sisyphus' Entrepreneurship,
54 IDEA 431, 467-75 (2014) (arguing for a negative information defense to
trade secret misappropriation involving a final product so that wasteful research
failures would not be duplicated by competitors).
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Restatement of Employment Law follow this Uniform Act departure from
the Restatement (First) of Torts.24
To have rights under the Uniform Act, a plaintiff must allege and prove
that the information at issue satisfies the definition of a trade secret. 25 This
absolute prerequisite to relief requires plaintiffs to objectively and precisely
identify the information for which protection is sought.26
The definition has three parts. The preamble is a non-exclusive list of
the forms in which trade secrets can appear. This non-exclusive list tracks
Comment b. to § 757 of the Restatement (First) of Torts with the addition of
"program," "method," and "technique" and the omission of "list of custom-
ers."27 Because the list is not exclusive, neither the addition of "program,"
"method," and "technique" nor the omission of "list of customers" affects the
information that can be a trade secret. 28
24. RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 1, § 39 cmt. d at 429-30
(discussing abandonment of the continuous use requirement). The Restatement
of Employment Law definition of "employer's trade secret" does not refer to
"continuous use." See RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW, supra note 1, § 8.02. Also,
comment a. to § 8.02 states that the definition is consistent with both the Uni-
form Act and the Restatement of Unfair Competition. Id. § 8.02, cmt. a at 406.
25. See UNIFORM Acr, supra note 7, § 1(2) (only a "trade secret" can be misappro-
priated); Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as
IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 342 (2008) [hereinafter Lemley, IP Rights]
("The USTA ... defines the legal rights of trade secret owners by requiring the
existence of a secret and defining what constitutes a secret.").
26. E.g., Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 897
(Minn. 1983) (Minnesota enactment) ("Without a proven trade secret there can
be no action for misappropriation, even if defendants' actions were wrong-
ful."); see Charles Tait Graves, Trade Secrets as Property: Theory and Conse-
quences, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39, 46-57 (2007) (discussing the importance of
requiring a plaintiff to identify objectively and precisely the information sought
to be protected); Electro-Craft Corp., 332 N.W.2d at 898 ("Furthermore, given
ECC's lack of specificity, it was impossible for the district court to fashion a
meaningful injunction which would not overly restrict legitimate competition
for the IBM project.").
27. Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, supra note 11, and accompanying
text, with UNIFORM AcT, supra note 20, and accompanying text.
28. E.g., East v. Aqua Gaming, Inc., 805 So. 2d 932, 934 (Fla. App. 2001) (Florida
enactment) (sufficient evidence supported the trial court's finding that Aqua
Gaming's customer list was a trade secret produced with great expense and
effort, was not available from public sources, and had been distilled from larger
lists of potential customers into a list of viable customers for its unique busi-
ness of buying, selling, and refurbishing casino gaming equipment); see Am.
Paper & Packaging Prods., Inc. v. Kirgan, 228 Cal. Rptr. 713, 716 (Cal. App.
2d Dist. 1986) (California enactment) ("We cannot agree with respondents'
argument that the Legislature's failure to include customer lists in its definition
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Subpart (i) requires that a trade secret derive "actual or potential inde-
pendent economic value" from "not being generally known to, or readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use."29 Information that is actually or potentially
valuable, because it is kept from competitors, is sufficiently novel to be pro-
tected.3 0 "Independent economic value" derived from secrecy can be shown
by proof of both adequate secrecy and either actual or potential value.31 The
Restatement of Unfair Competition, for example, expresses the Uniform
Act's definition as "any information that . . . is sufficiently valuable and
secret to afford an actual or a potential economic advantage over others."32
In Thermodyne Food Service Products, Inc. v. AFTEC, Inc., affidavits
from the plaintiffs Chief Operating Officer and Project Manager were suffi-
cient to create fact issues as to the secrecy of the alleged trade secrets and the
of trade secrets represents an intentional exclusion of same. The very language
of Civil Code 3426.1 subdivision (d) is inclusive, not exclusive.").
29. UNIFORM AcT, supra note 7, § 1(4)(i) at 538. See 1 Melvin F. Jager, TRADE
SECRETS LAW § 5.15 (2013) ("This language defines secrecy, not a value re-
quirement per se."); Ramon A. Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64
MARQ. L. REv. 277, 288 (1980) (Under the Uniform Act, a trade secret "must
have actual or potential 'independent economic value' stemming from its
secrecy.").
30. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) ("[S]ome novelty
will be required if merely because that which does not possess novelty is usu-
ally known; secrecy, in the context of trade secrets, thus implies at least mini-
mal novelty."); see also Eric R. Claeys, Private Law Theory and Corrective
Justice in Trade Secrecy, 4 J. TORT LAW 30 (Oct. 2011), available at http://
ssm.com/abstract=1799554 ("The work must be . . . minimally novel . . .
nonascertainable by significant research by a reasonable competent
competitor.").
31. See, e.g., Electro-Craft Corp., 332 N.W.2d at 900-03 (Minnesota enactment)
(former employer proved that information provided a competitive advantage
and had economic value but failed to prove adequate secrecy).
32. RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 1, § 39, cmt. b at 427 (The
Restatement of Unfair Competition concept of trade secret is "intended to be
consistent with the definition of 'trade secret' in § 1(4) of the Act."); see
Electro-Craft Corp., 332 N.W.2d at 900-01 (Minnesota enactment) (informa-
tion's conferral of a competitive advantage showed that it had economic value).
Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 736 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1997)
(California enactment) (stating that "[t]he requirement that a customer list must
have economic value to qualify as a trade secret has been interpreted to mean
that the secrecy of the information provides a business with a 'substantial busi-
ness advantage."'). The Restatement (First) described a trade secret as informa-
tion that creates an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors. See
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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plaintiffs reasonable efforts to maintain that secrecy. 33 The court denied the
Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on these issues.34 But tes-
timony from independent experts with respect to the existence of actual or
potential value and adequate secrecy increases the likelihood of success. 35
Sufficient secrecy exists if information is not generally known to or
readily ascertainable through proper means by others who can obtain value
from its disclosure or use.36 The issue is what actual and potential competi-
tors generally know and readily can ascertain by proper means. 37 Both the
Restatement (First) of Torts and the Restatement of Unfair Competition
frame their secrecy tests this way. 38 Excluding from protection what the gen-
eral public knows, however, could deny protection for new combinations of
well-known facts;39 this approach also would treat as a trade secret informa-
33. Thermodyne Food Serv. Prods., Inc. v. AFTEC, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D.
Ill. 1996) (Illinois enactment).
34. Id. at 1305-07.
35. JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS (ALM) § 11.04 (2015) [hereinafter POOLEY,
TRADE SECRETS] ("[C]hances of success improve by drawing on independent
viewpoints."). However, an independent fact expert cannot testify as to whether
information is a trade secret as a matter of law. E.g., Contour Design, Inc. v.
Chance Mold Steel Co., Ltd., 794 F. Supp. 2d 315, 320 (D. N.H. 2011) (New
Hampshire enactment) (testimony of fact expert inadmissible with respect to
principles of trade secret law).
36. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 7, § 1(4) (i) at 538.
37. E.g., Noah v. Enesco Corp., 911 F. Supp. 299, 304 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (Illinois
enactment) ("The Act 'preclude[s] protection for information not generally
known to the public but clearly understood in a particular industry."'); see also
Mangren Research & Dev. Corp. v. Nat'l Chem. Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 937, 942
(7th Cir. 1996) (Illinois enactment) (stating in dictum that "trade secret protec-
tion for information generally known within an industry even if not to the pub-
lic at large . . ." is precluded.); Stenstrom Petroleum Servs. Grp., Inc. v. Mesch,
874 N.E.2d 959, 972 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 2007) (Illinois enactment) (stating in
dictum that "[i]nformation that is generally known or understood within an
industry, even if not known to the public at large, does not qualify as a trade
secret.").
38. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 757, cmt. b (a trade
secret is information "which ... gives an opportunity to obtain an advantage
over competitors who do not know or use it."); RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COM-
PETITION, supra note 1, § 39, cmt. f at 431-32 ("[T]he requirement of secrecy
is satisfied if it would be difficult or costly for others who could exploit the
information to acquire it without resort to the wrongful conduct proscribed
under § 40 . . . . Information that is generally known or readily ascertainable by
proper means (see § 43) by others to whom it has potential economic value is
not protectable as a trade secret.").
39. See Hertz v. Luzenac Grp., 576 F.3d 1103, 1109-13 (10th Cir. 2009) (Colorado
enactment) (reversing summary judgment for a former employee because the
trial court had focused exclusively upon knowledge of the elements of the for-
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tion well-known to actual and potential competitors that was not known by
the general public.40 Nevertheless, non-uniform amendments in six states re-
quire that a trade secret be not generally known to "the public" as well as to
persons who can derive value from its disclosure or use.4 1
At least two (possibly three) of these states also require that a trade
secret be not readily ascertainable through proper means by either the public
or actual and potential competitors.42 For example, the Nevada non-uniform
amendment states, "not being generally known to, and not being readily as-
certainable by proper means by the public or any other persons who can
obtain commercial or economic value from its disclosure or use . . . ."43
Because "the public" is one of two referents, it is unlikely, but not impossi-
ble, that "the public" in these statutes could be construed to refer to the "eco-
nomically relevant" public of actual and potential competitors.44 If "the
public" is not so restricted, this non-uniform amendment places an additional
and unnecessary burden of proof upon a plaintiff that could result in a denial
mer employer's production process without also considering whether the pro-
cess as a whole was well-known); accord Rivendell Forest Prods., Ltd. v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 28 F.3d 1042, 1045-46 (10th Cir. 1994) (Colorado en-
actment) (reversing summary judgment for a former employee because the trial
court had focused exclusively upon knowledge of the elements of the software
without also considering the protectability of the software system as a whole).
40. As amended, in 1985, the comment to § I of the Uniform Act states in part: "If
the principal persons who can obtain economic benefit from information are
aware of it, there is no trade secret. A method of casting metal, for example,
may be unknown to the general public but readily known in the foundry indus-
try." UNIFORM ACT, supra note 7, § 1, cmt. at 538; U.S. v. Lange, 312 F.3d
263, 267 (7th Cir. 2002) (Lange is an Economic Espionage Act case in which
Judge Easterbrook observed in dictum that: "A problem with using the general
public as the reference group for identifying a trade secret is that many things
unknown to the public at large are well known to engineers, scientists, and
others whose intellectual property the Economic Espionage Act was enacted to
protect."). See infra notes 82-118 and accompanying text for discussion of the
Economic Espionage Act.
41. ALA. CODE § 8-27-2(1) (c) (LexisNexis 2002); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)
(West 1997); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600A.030(5) (a) (LexisNexis 2012);
ORE. REv. STAT. § 646.461(4) (a) (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-20(5)(a)(i)
(2014 Supp.). A Georgia non-uniform variation refers to information "which is
not commonly known by . . . the public." GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-761(4)
(2009).
42. See Nevada and South Carolina non-uniform amendments in supra note 41.
The Georgia non-uniform amendment requires that information be not "availa-
ble to the public." Id.
43. NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600A.030(5)(a) (2010).
44. See Lange, 312 F.3d at 267.
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of protection to valuable new combinations of public domain elements.45 But,
because it is in addition to the requirement that the information not be gener-
ally known to persons who could derive value from its disclosure or use, the
reference to "the public" further burdens a plaintiff without increasing the
information that qualifies as a trade secret.
On the other hand, a Nebraska non-uniform amendment deleted the
qualifying words "generally" before "known to" and "readily" before "ascer-
tainable."46 Accordingly, if information is capable of being ascertained by
any theoretical proper means, no matter how improbable, expensive, or time-
consuming that proper means is, the information cannot be a statutory trade
secret in Nebraska!47 However, the significance of both these Nebraska non-
uniform amendments and of Nebraska's enactment of the Uniform Act also
was eroded by the state's deletion of the Uniform Act provision preempting
common-law principles of trade secret misappropriation.48 The combined ef-
fect of these non-uniform amendments is to preserve in Nebraska the more
inclusive common-law definition of trade secret and to minimize the signifi-
cance of Nebraska's enactment of the Uniform Act. 4 9
The Uniform Act's exclusion of information that is "readily ascertaina-
ble by proper means"50 was omitted by four states. 51 Omission in California
was proposed by the Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Section of the Cali-
fornia State Bar on the ground that this "difficult to determine" issue would
45. See Hertz, 576 F.3d at 1109-13 (Colorado enactment) (reversing summary
judgment for a former employee because the trial court had focused exclusively
upon knowledge of the elements of the former employer's production process
without also considering whether the process as a whole was well known).
46. NEB. REv. STAT. § 87-502(4)(a) (2008).
47. See First Express Serv. Grp., Inc. v. Easter, 286 Neb. 912, 924-27 (Neb. 2013)
(Nebraska enactment) (holding customer information that is ascertainable by
any proper means is not protectable); Gerald B. Buechler, Jr., Revealing Ne-
braska's Trade Secrets Act, 23 CREIGHTON L. REV. 323, 339 (1990) ("[T]he ...
[Nebraska non-uniform amendment] extends the concept of permissible reverse
engineering to its illogical extreme.").
48. Id. at 342-43.
49. Id. at 343.
50. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 7, § 1(4)(i).
51. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West 2015); COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-74-
102(4) (West 2013); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1065/2(d)(1) (LexisNexis
2014); ORE. REV. STAT. § 646.461(4)(a) (2012). By contrast, the Nevada and
South Carolina non-uniform amendments require that information be not read-
ily accessible by proper means by "the public." Refer to the authority in supra
note 41. This raises the same issues as the non-uniform amendments requiring
that information be not generally known by the public. See supra notes 41-45
and accompanying text.
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generate unnecessary litigation.52 However, the California deletion was cou-
pled with non-uniform commentary stating that information being readily as-
certainable by proper means is a defense to misappropriation.53 James Pooley
consequently predicted that the apparent significant statutory change would
have little effect.54
Experience in Illinois, which also deleted "readily ascertainable by
proper means,"55 supports Pooley's insight. The Restatement (First) of Torts
identified two types of evidence relevant to what is readily ascertainable: the
amount of effort or money expended by the plaintiff in developing informa-
tion and the ease or difficulty with which the information could be acquired
by others using proper means.56 The Restatement (First) also observed that
52. Gloria Mae Wong, The Secret's Out: California's Adoption of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act-Effects on the Employer-Employee Relationship, 20 Lov.
L.A. L. REV. 1167, 1213-14, n.231 (1987).
53. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West 1997) ("[T]he assertion that a matter is
readily ascertainable by proper means remains available as a defense to
misappropriation.").
54. James H. Pooley, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act: California Civil Code 3426,
1 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L. J. 193, 198-99, 216 (1985); see American
Paper & Packaging Prods., Inc. v. Kirgan, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1318, 1326 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986) (California enactment) ("While the information sought to be
protected here, that is lists of customers who operate manufacturing concerns
and who need shipping supplies to ship their products to market, may not be
generally known to the public, they certainly would be known or readily ascer-
tainable to others in the shipping business."); Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 56 Cal.
App. 4th 1514, 1522 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (California enactment) ("In the case
at bar, the court heard testimony that Morlife's customers were not readily
ascertainable, but only discoverable with great effort . . . ."). But see Abba
Rubber Co. v. Seaquist, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1, 21, n. 9 (Cal. Ct. App.1991) (Cali-
fornia enactment) ("[O]ur legislature chose to exclude from the definition only
that information which the industry already knows, as opposed to that which
the industry could easily discover.").
55. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West 2015); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-74-
102(4) (West 2013); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1065/2(d)(1) (LexisNexis
2014); ORE. REv. STAT. § 646.461(4)(a) (2012). By contrast, the Nevada and
South Carolina non-uniform amendments require that information be not read-
ily accessible by proper means by "the public." Refer to the authority in supra
note 41. This raises the same issues as the non-uniform amendments requiring
that information be not generally known by the public. See supra notes 41-45
and accompanying text.
56. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 757 cmt. b (1939). The ease
or difficulty with which the information could be acquired by others using
proper means is most important. In Learning Curve Toys, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reinstated a jury verdict for a toy designer who developed a
toy design for less than one dollar in less than a half hour that defendant had
been unable to replicate by proper means. Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v.
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"[m]atters which are completely disclosed by the goods which one markets
cannot be his secret."57 In Hamer Holding Group, Inc. v. Elmore,58 an Illinois
intermediate appellate court rejected the plaintiff s contention that the Illinois
non-uniform amendment had eliminated "readily ascertainable by proper
means" as a defense. The court held that the ease with which information
could be discovered legally was "the key" to whether adequate "secrecy"
existed.59 Furthermore, in Computer Care v. Service Systems Enterprises,
Inc.,60 a Seventh Circuit decision applying Illinois law, a court of appeals
panel reversed a preliminary injunction in part due to the plaintiff's failure to
present evidence of "the amount of time, money, or effort" required to de-
velop the information at issue.61 The Indiana Supreme Court also has equated
"not readily ascertainable by proper means" with exclusion of information
that does not require a substantial investment in time, expense, or effort law-
fully to develop.62
The Uniform Act requirement that a trade secret be "the subject of ef-
forts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy"63
has been the subject of revision rather than omission by enacting jurisdic-
Playwood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2003) (Illinois enact-
ment). The effort and money expended by the plaintiff in developing the infor-
mation has been described as a proxy for the effort and expense that a
competitor would have to engage in to develop the information by proper
means. AMY E. DAVIS ET AL., GUIDE TO PROTECTING AND LITIGATING TRADE
SECRETS 11 (2012).
57. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 757 cmt. b. However, a trade
secret can exist prior to the marketing of a product that will disclose the secret
completely. Learning Curve Toys, 342 F.3d at 729-30 (Illinois enactment)
(reinstating jury verdict of misappropriation with respect to an unmarketed toy
design that would be disclosed completely by the sale of the toy).
58. Hamer Holding Grp., Inc. v. Elmore, 202 Ill. App. 3d 994, 1012 (111. App. Ct.
1991), reh'g denied, 136 Ill. 2d 544, 544 (Ill. 1991) (Illinois enactment).
59. Id.; accord Weins v. Sporleder, 569 N.W.2d 16, 21 (S.D. 1997) (South Dakota
enactment).
60. Computer Care v. Serv. Sys. Enter., Inc., 982 F.2d 1063, 1072 (7th Cir. 1992)
(Illinois enactment).
61. Id. at 1072-75.
62. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E.2d 912, 919 (Ind. 1993) (Indiana enact-
ment). See generally Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law
And Why Courts Commit Error When They Do Not Follow The Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REv. 493, 522 (2010) ("[E]vidence of the invest-
ment that was made to create the information may be relevant to show that the
information cannot be easily recreated . . . .").
63. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 7, § 1(4)(ii). Efforts to maintain secrecy typically
include both physical steps and steps to give notice of trade secret rights. In
Zemco Manufacturing, Inc. v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., the
court gave the following examples:
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tions.64 On the other hand, the Restatement (First) of Torts identified "the
extent of measures taken. .. to guard the secrecy of the information" as one
of six non-exclusive factors relevant to the existence of a trade secret.65 The
Restatement of Unfair Competition commented on the Uniform Act's requir-
ing evidence of reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy for a trade secret to
exist as follows:
Whether viewed as an independent requirement or as an element
to be considered with other factors relevant to the existence of a
trade secret, the owner's precautions should be evaluated in light
of the other available evidence relating to the value and secrecy of
the information. Thus, if the value and secrecy of the information
1) requiring employees to sign confidentiality agreements or otherwise ad-
vising them of the confidential nature of the process; 2) posting warning or
cautionary signs, or placing warnings on documents; 3) requiring visitors
to sign confidentiality agreements, sign in, and shielding the process from
their view; 4) segregating information; 5) using unnamed or code-named
ingredients; and 6) keeping secret documents under lock.
759 N.E.2d 239, 246 (Ind. App. 2001), transfer to Indiana Supreme Court den.,
774 N.E.2d 519 (Ind. 2002) (Indiana enactment). To the extent that trade
secrets are stored electronically, electronic precautions should be taken. See
generally Elizabeth A. Rowe, Rethinking 'Reasonable Efforts' to Protect Trade
Secrets in a Digital World (Sept. 5, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (available
at http://works.bepress.comlelizabeth-rowe/2). Storing trade secrets in the
"Cloud" involves another level of precautions. See Sharon K. Sandeen, Lost in
the Cloud: Information Flows and the Implications of Cloud Computing for
Trade Secret Protection, 19 VA. J. L. & TECH. 1 (2014). Several appellate
courts have indicated that a small business can utilize less elaborate precautions
than a large business. E.g., Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. Playwood Toys, Inc.,
342 F.3d 714, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2003) (Illinois enactment) (the jury could have
found that the small business relied on an oral confidentiality agreement);
Niemi v. NHK Spring Co., 543 F.3d 294, 299-303 (6th Cir. 2008) (Ohio enact-
ment) (small business' assertion that it had relied on an oral confidentiality
agreement created a fact issue); see also Elm City Cheese Co. v. Federico, 251
Conn. 59, 85 (Conn. 1999) (Connecticut enactment) (excusing the plaintiff pri-
vately-held corporation's failure to obtain nondisclosure and noncompetition
agreements from the defendant, its C.P.A. and Vice President, in view of the
plaintiffs owners' close personal relationship with the defendant).
64. E.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-74-102(4) (West 2013) ("To be a 'trade se-
cret' the owner thereof must have taken measures to prevent the secret from
becoming available to persons other than those selected by the owner to have
access thereto for limited purposes."); D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-401(4)(B) (West
2014) (". . . is the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.").
65. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 757 cmt. b (1939).
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are clear, evidence of specific precautions taken by the trade se-
cret owner may be unnecessary. 66
Professor Mark Lemley believes that it is preferable to treat reasonable
efforts to maintain secrecy as evidence of secrecy as the Restatement (First)
of Torts and the Restatement of Unfair Competition do,67 rather than as a
condition to the existence of a trade secret.68 But the Uniform Act does not
impose a difficult-to-satisfy condition. "Reasonable efforts" do not require
extreme or unduly expensive efforts.69 What is most important is controlling
disclosure to employees and third parties, including licensees.70 Moreover, it
may be questioned whether a person asserting trade secret rights in litigation
should ever rely upon the value and secrecy of the information being so clear
that admissible evidence of secrecy and value prudently could be omitted.7'
The Uniform Act's requirement that a trade secret involve reasonable efforts
to maintain secrecy also encourages desirable precautions that give notice of
claimed trade secret rights72 and denies protection to claims that a developer
66. RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 1. As the Restatement of
Unfair Competition recognizes, the efforts of a person claiming trade secret
rights to maintain secrecy also are evidence that the information involved has
value. E.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179
(7th Cir. 1991) (Illinois enactment) ("the owner's precautions .. . evidence that
the secret has real value").
67. The Restatement of Employment Law and the EEA follow the Uniform Act's
approach. Compare UNIFORM AcT, supra note 7, and accompanying text, with
RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW, supra note 1, § 8.02(b), RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
TORTS, supra note 11 and accompanying text, and 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A)
(2012).
68. Lemley, IP Rights, supra note 25, at 348-50.
69. UNIFORM AcT, supra note 7, § 1(4); Rockwell Graphics Sys., Inc., 925 F.2d at
180 (Illinois enactment) (Posner, J.) (dictum) ("If trade secrets are protected
only if their owners take extravagant, productivity-impairing measures to main-
tain their secrecy, the incentive to invest resources in discovering more effi-
cient methods of production will be reduced, and with it the amount of
invention.").
70. UNIFORM AcT, supra note 7, § 1(4).
71. RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 1. The Restatement of Un-
fair Competition's reference to situations in which both value and secrecy are
clear may be more theoretical than real.
72. See Incase, Inc. v. Timex Corp., 488 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2007) (Massachusetts
law) ("The fact that Incase kept its work for Timex private from the world is
not sufficient . . . . [T]here must be affirmative steps to preserve the secrecy of
the information as against the party against whom the misappropriation claim is
made."); see also Adam Waks, Where the Trade Secret Sits: How the Eco-
nomic Espionage Act Is Inflaming Tensions in the Employment Relationship,
and How Smart Employers and Employees Are Responding, 3 N.Y.U. J. IN-
TELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 391, 406 (2014) (describing "precautions against rea-
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of information gave no thought until the advent of competition indicated the
value of the information.73
Most of the non-uniform amendments to the definition of trade secret
have involved expansion of the illustrations of the information that can be a
trade secret. Ohio, for example, added, "the whole or any portion or phase of
any scientific or technical information, design . . . procedure . . . or improve-
ment, or any business information or plans, financial information, or listing
of names, addresses, or telephone numbers . . . ."74 On the other hand, out of
an abundance of caution, some states added "but not limited to," or an
equivalent, following "including" prior to the list of illustrations,75 whereas
other states accepted the recommended definition.76 Alaska was unique in
deleting all the illustrations and defining a trade secret as "information" that
satisfied the substantive definition,77 as contemporary Restatements do.78
On balance, except in Nebraska,79 the non-uniform amendments to the
definition of trade secret have not had a major impact. Even the definition of
trade secret in the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act, which other-
wise is not regarded by the ULC as substantially similar to the Uniform
Act,so is comparable to the Uniform Act definition.si
sonably foreseeable intrusions" as an employer "best practice."). See contra
Robert G. Bone, Trade Secrecy, Innovation and the Requirement of Reasonable
Secrecy Precautions, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY 67, 72-75
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011) (Although in-
clined to support abolition of the reasonable efforts requirement, Professor
Bone recognized that the extent of the precautions adopted can signal to com-
petitors both the perceived value of trade secrets and the aggressiveness of the
business claiming them.).
73. Elizabeth A. Rowe, Contributory Negligence, Technology, and Trade Secrets,
17 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1, 8 (2009) ("Normatively, it makes sense to treat the
reasonable efforts requirement as a separate requirement because it encourages
the courts and litigants to filter out those putative trade secrets whose value is
only recognized by the plaintiff after the alleged misappropriation occurs.").
74. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.61(D) (LexisNexis 2015); accord COLO.
REV. STAT. § 7-74-102(4) (LexisNexis 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-761(4)
(LexisNexis 2009). A number of the additions are discussed in Linda B. Samu-
els & Bryan K. Johnson, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act: The States' Response,
24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 49, 62-67 (1990).
75. E.g., IoWA CODE § 550.2(4) (2015).
76. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 688.002(4) (2015).
77. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.940(3) (2015).
78. See RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 1; RESTATEMENT OF
EMP. LAW, supra note 1, § 8.02.
79. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
81. Compare N. C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(3) (2013) (the statute reads as follows:
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IV. THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT
On October 11, 1996, President Clinton signed the Economic Espionage
Act (EEA),82 the first significant federal statute specifically criminalizing
trade secret theft.83 The EEA is a combination of two bills, one dealing with
economic espionage intended to benefit foreign governments, foreign instru-
mentalities, or foreign agents84 and the other dealing with industrial espio-
nage. 85 Both bills initially referred to "proprietary economic information,"86
with definitions modeling the Uniform Act definition of trade secret.87 The
enacted statute applies to both economic espionage involving trade secrets
and theft of trade secrets.88 Section 1831, the economic espionage provision,
requires that an actor either intend or know that the offense "will benefit any
foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent." 89 Section
1832, the industrial espionage provision, requires proof of an intent to con-
vert a trade secret related to a product or service used in or intended for use
"Trade Secret" means business or technical information, including but not
limited to a formula, pattern, program, device, compilation of information,
method, technique, or process that:
a. Derives independent actual or potential commercial value from not
being generally known or readily ascertainable through independent
development or reverse engineering by persons who can obtain eco-
nomic value from its disclosure or use; and
b. Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances
to maintain its secrecy.
The existence of a trade secret shall not be negated merely because the
information comprising the trade secret has also been developed, used, or
owned independently by more than one person, or licensed to other
persons.),
with supra note 20 (The Comment to § 1 of the Uniform Act states that inde-
pendent developers can acquire rights in the same trade secret and that con-
trolled disclosure to employees and licensees is consistent with relative
secrecy. UNIFORM AcT, supra note 7, § I & cmt.
82. Economic Espionage Act, Pub. L. 104-294, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. (1996) (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2012)).
83. POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 35, § 13.3.
84. Economic Security Act of 1996, S. 1557, 104th Cong. (1996).
85. S. Rep. 104-359, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. (1996) (discussing S.1556 proposing the
Industrial Espionage Act of 1996).
86. Id. at 3 (discussing S. 1556). S. 1557, the proposed Economic Security Act of
1996, added "vital" to the phrase. S. 1557, § 901(4), 104th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1996) (definition of "vital proprietary economic information.").
87. Id. at 16 ("This definition is closely modeled on the definition of a 'trade se-
cret' used in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.").
88. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a), 1832(a) (2012).
89. § 1831(a) (preamble).
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in interstate or foreign commerce to the economic benefit of anyone other
than the owner of the trade secret either intending or knowing that the trade
secret owner will be injured.90
The penalties are severe. Violation of § 1831, the economic espionage
provision, can subject an individual to a fine of up to $5,000,000 or fifteen
years imprisonment, or both;91 an organization can be fined the greater of
$10,000,000 or three times the value of the stolen trade secret to the defen-
dant, including costs saved.92 Violation of § 1832, the industrial espionage
provision, can subject an individual to the greater of a fine of up to two times
the gross gain from the offense, the gross loss from the offense, or $250,000,
whichever is larger, or imprisonment for up to ten years, or both;93 and an
organization can be fined of up to $5,000,000.94 Attempts and conspiracies to
violate both provisions have the same penalties as actual violations.95 Yet a
defendant can be convicted of an attempt or participation in a conspiracy
based upon evidence that the defendant believed the information was a trade
secret; the government need not prove that a statutory trade secret existed.96
In addition, the property involved in and derived from misappropriation is
subject to forfeiture,97 and a convicted defendant must pay restitution to
victims.98
Both provisions mentioned above share a definition of "trade secret"
based largely on the Uniform Act:
all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, ec-
onomic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans,
compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes,
methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes,
90. § 1832(a) (preamble).
91. § 1831(a).
92. Id. (b).
93. § 1832(a) (because the EEA does not specify the maximum fine for individual
violators the general felony maximums apply); § 3571(b)(3) (2012) (an indi-
vidual can be fined a maximum of either two times the gross gain or gross loss
caused by the offense, whichever is larger, or $250,000); § 3571(b)(2)-(3);
§ 3571(d).
94. § 1832(b).
95. See § 1831(a)(4)-(5); § 1832(a)(4)-(5).
96. E.g., U.S. v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 204 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[P]roof that the defend-
ants sought to steal actual trade secrets is not an element of the crimes of at-
tempt or conspiracy under the EEA."); see also U.S. v. Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d
623, 630-31 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (denying a motion to dismiss an EEA indictment
due to the vagueness of the EEA definition of trade secret primarily because
the defendant was charged with attempt and conspiracy).
97. §§ 1834, 2323(a)(1).
98. §§ 1834, 2323, 3663A(a)(1).
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whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, com-
piled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, pho-
tographically, or in writing if
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep
such information secret;
and
(B) the information derives independent economic value, ac-
tual or potential, from not being generally known to, and
not being readily ascertainable through proper means by,
the public . .. .99
Notwithstanding its expansive language and severe penalties, the EEA
has been sparingly enforced by the U.S. Justice Department. A 2012 analysis
of enforcement actions found approximately 124 prosecutions in the first six-
teen years, an average of less than eight a year. 0 0 Moreover, prosecutions
occurred in less than forty-five percent of federal judicial districts.10 Less
than ten percent of the prosecutions involved economic espionage. More than
ninety percent involved industrial espionage.102 The sparse number of annual
prosecutions suggests that the EEA has not been a major deterrent to trade
secret theft.03
The EEA illustrative listO4 of the forms and types of information that
can be a trade secret is far more elaborate than the Uniform Act's illustrative
list, but that is not a substantive difference.105 Nor is the EEA's express refer-
ences to "intangible" trade secrets and "whether or how" memorialized. De-
liberately memorizing a trade secret that has not been physically
99. § 1839(3); see H.R. Rep. No. 104-788, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. at 12 (1996)
("The definition of 'trade secret' is based largely on the definition of that term
in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.").
100. Peter J. Toren, An Analysis of Economic Espionage Act Prosecutions: What
Companies Can Learn From It and What the Government Should Be Doing
About It!, 84 PTCJ 884 (2012), http://petertoren.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/
10/toren-eea2.pdf.
101. Id. at 886.
102. Id.
103. Id. ("[E]nhancing the certainty of punishment produces a stronger deterrent
effect than enhancing the severity of the punishment.").
104. H.R. Rep. No. 104-788, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. at 12 (1996) ("These general
categories of information are included in the definition of trade secret for illus-
trative purposes and should not be read to limit the definition of trade secret. It
is the Committee's intent that this definition be read broadly.").
105. James H. A. Pooley et al., Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996,
5 TEX. INTELL. PRop. L.J. 177, 189 (1997) [hereinafter Pooley et al., Under-
standing the EEA] ("Because of the expansive interpretation already given to
the UTSA definition, the EEA will probably apply to the same types of
information . . . .").
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memorialized is actionable under the Act.106 In Ed Nowogroski Insurance,
Inc. v. Rucker, the Washington Supreme Court stated in an en banc opinion:
The form of information, whether written or memorized, is imma-
terial under the . . . Uniform Trade Secrets Act [which] makes no
distinction about the form of trade secrets. Whether the informa-
tion is on a CD, a blueprint, a film, a recording, a hard paper copy
or memorized by the employee, the inquiry is whether it meets the
definition of trade secret under the Act . . . .107
On the other hand, the EEA defines trade secrets as information not
generally known to, or readily and ascertainable by proper means by "the
public";108 whereas the Uniform Act refers to trade secrets as information not
generally known to, and not readily ascertainable by proper means by "per-
sons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use."109 The issue
is whether the EEA refers to the public "in general" or to the "economically
relevant" public; namely, actual and potential competitors of the person
claiming trade secret rights.
The federal courts have addressed the issue in dicta but have avoided
resolving it authoritatively. In United States v. Hsu,, 1 o the Third Circuit com-
mented in dicta, "[t]he EEA . . . indicates that a trade secret must not be
generally known to, or readily ascertainable by, the general public, rather
than simply those who can obtain economic value from the secret's disclo-
sure or use.""'1
The Seventh Circuit subsequently discussed whether "the public" is the
"general" public or the "economically relevant" public. In United States v.
Lange,112 Judge Easterbrook observed in dicta:
106. RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW, supra note 1, § 8.02, Reporters' Notes to cmt. g
at 421 ("[M]ore than 40 states have adopted the UTSA in a substantially simi-
lar form and the majority position is that memorized information can be the
basis for a trade-secret claim.").
107. Ed Nowogroski Ins., Inc. v. Rucker, 971 P.2d 936, 948 (Wash. 1999) (en banc)
(Washington enactment); accord Al Minor & Assoc. v. Martin, 881 N.E.2d
850, 855 (Ohio 2008) (Ohio enactment) ("[I]nformation ... is protected by the
UTSA, regardless of the manner, mode, or form in which it is stored-whether
on paper, in a computer, in one's memory, or in any other medium."); see also
Stampede Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. May, 651 N.E.2d 209, 217 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995) (Illinois enactment) ("[M]emorization is one method of
misappropriation.").
108. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (2012).
109. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 7, § 1(4)(i).
110. U.S. v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1998).
111. Id. at 196.
112. U.S. v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 2002).
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A problem with using the general public as the reference group for
identifying a trade secret is that many things unknown to the pub-
lic are well known to engineers, scientists and others whose intel-
lectual property the Economic Espionage act was enacted to
protect . . . . Section 1839(3)(B) replaces "persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use" with "the public." The
prosecutor believes that the substitution supports the conclusion
that Congress referred to the general public. Yet one could say
instead that "the public" is shorthand for the longer phrase, which
then would be read as "the economically relevant public"-that is,
the persons whose ignorance of the information is the source of its
economic value.113
The Ninth Circuit has noted the conflicting dicta without taking a position.114
Federal district courts also have avoided ruling upon the issue by finding that
the information at issue was neither generally known to nor readily ascertain-
able by proper means by both the general public and the economically rele-
vant public.'15
The decisive consideration should be the severe penalties for EEA vio-
lations.116 Interpreting the reference as being to the general public would
dramatically lower the threshold for imposing these penalties.l17 It also
would unmoor the definition of trade secret from the source of the value of
the information at issue.118
113. Id. at 267.
114. U.S. v. Chung, 659 F.3d 815, 825 (9th Cir. 2011).
115. E.g., U.S. v. Jin, 833 F. Supp. 2d 977, 1007-08 (N.D. 111. 2012), affd, 733 F.3d
718 (7th Cir. 2013).
116. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
117. See Pooley et al., Understanding the EEA, supra note 105, at 191 ("We think it
unlikely that such a dramatic change was intended by Congress, however.
Thus, we expect that the relevant test will continue to be whether those who
have an economic interest in discovering the secret can easily do so."). Contra
Comment, Ninth Circuit Upholds First Trial Conviction Under § 1831 of the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 125 HARv. L. REv. 2177, 2184 (2012)
("[N]arrowly construing 'the public' under the EEA could saddle the govern-
ment with a prohibitive burden of proof. In accordance with the EEA's legisla-
tive purpose, courts should thus interpret the 'readily ascertainable' prong to
refer more expansively to the general public.").
118. See U.S. v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263, 267 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Section 1839(3)(B) as a
whole refers to the source of economic value-that the information is not
known to or easily discoverable by persons who could use it productively. To
make this work, either the phrase 'readily ascertainable' or the phrase 'the pub-
lic' must be understood to concentrate attention on either potential users of the
information, or proxies for them . . . .").
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V. THE MODERN RESTATEMENTS
The 1995 Restatement of Unfair Competition defines a trade secret as
"any information ... that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an
actual or potential economic advantage over others."'19 Although this black-
letter definition does not literally state that a trade secret must be kept secret
from actual and potential competitors, doing so is what would create an eco-
nomic advantage.120 Comment f recognizes this, stating that information
generally known to or readily ascertainable by proper means by persons to
whom it has potential economic value is not protectable.121 In sum, with the
exception of the Restatement of Unfair Competition's position that a plaintiff
is not invariably required to demonstrate reasonable efforts to maintain se-
crecy,1 22 the Restatement of Unfair Competition's definition, when read in
conjunction with commentf, approximates the Uniform Act's definition.123
The 2015 Restatement of Employment Law contains the following defi-
nition of an "employer's trade secret":
An employer's information is a trade secret under this Chapter if:
(a) it derives independent economic value from being kept
secret;
(b) the employer has taken reasonable measures to keep it
secret; and
(c) the information is not
(1) generally known to the public or in the employer's
industry;
(2) readily obtainable by others through proper means;
or
(3) acquired by employees through their general experi-
ence, knowledge, training, or skills during the ordi-
nary course of their employment.124
Comment a. states:
119. RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 1, at § 39.
120. See id.
121. Id. cmt. f at 431-32 ("[T]he requirement of secrecy is satisfied if it would be
difficult or costly for others who could exploit the information to acquire it
without resort to the wrongful conduct proscribed under § 40 . . .. Information
that is generally known or readily ascertainable through proper means (see
§ 43) by others to whom it has potential economic value is not protectable as a
trade secret.").
122. See RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 66 and accompanying
text.
123. RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 1, § 39 cmt. b at 427 ("The
concept of a trade secret as defined in this Section is intended to be consistent
with the definition of 'trade secret' in § 1(4) of the [Uniform] Act.").
124. RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW, supra note 1, § 8.02.
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The definition of "trade secret" in this Section is consistent with
the definitions of trade secret used in the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act (UTSA), the Restatement Third, Unfair Competition § 39, and
the Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1839.125
A Reporters' Note to comment a. adds, "[t]his Section corresponds to these
three definitions but explicitly adds the key point that employee knowledge
gained from general training is not a trade secret."l26
The Restatement of Employment Law's definition tracks the Uniform
Act's definition with reference to deriving "independent economic value
from being kept secret" and taking "reasonable measures to keep it secret,"
and also by not protecting information that is "generally known" or "readily
obtainable by proper means."27 But in requiring that an employer's trade
secret not be "generally known to the public," the Restatement of Employ-
ment Law's definition appears to reject both the Uniform Act's and the Re-
statement of Unfair Competition's focus upon what is generally known to
and readily ascertainable by proper means by actual and potential competi-
tors. 1 28 This would endorse the non-uniform amendments in six states, appar-
ently requiring that a trade secret be not generally known to both the public
and potential and actual competitors.129 However, if Comment a. is taken at
face value, this was not intended and "not generally known to the public" is
not literally "not generally known to the general public." Consistency with
the Uniform Act and the Restatement of Unfair Competition would be pre-
served by reading "not generally known to the public" as referring to "not
generally known to the [economically relevant] public."130 At the present
time, this reading also would preserve consistency with the EEA. However,
if it ultimately is determined that the EEA refers to the "general public,"31
this harmonizing interpretation of the Restatement of Employment Law
would be inconsistent with the EEA.
Another issue raised by the Restatement of Employment Law's defini-
tion of "employer's trade secret" is the exclusion of information "acquired by
employees through their general experience, knowledge, training or skills
during the ordinary course of employment."132 Comment e. elaborates:
125. Id. cmt. a at 406.
126. Id. Reporters' Notes to cmt. a at 412.
127. See UNIFORM ACr, supra note 20 and accompanying text.
128. See UNIFORM AcT, supra notes 36, 38 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (noting Judge Easterbrook's elabo-
ration of what the reference to "the public" in the EEA could mean).
131. See supra notes 108-115 and accompanying text (noting the federal courts
have not construed authoritatively the EEA's reference to "the public").
132. RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW, supra note 1, at § 8.02(c)(3).
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An employee's general experience, knowledge, training and skills,
including any increase in experience, knowledge, training and
skills obtained in the ordinary course of employment, are not trade
secrets within the meaning of this Section. Such non-trade-secret
information, which normally includes knowledge about the habits
and preferences of particular customers or other persons, may be
used by a former employee as part of legitimate competition with
a former employer. However, knowledge about the employer's
special processes, the content of an employer's specially designed
training program, or its specially developed "sales pitch materi-
als," may qualify for trade-secret protection in appropriate
circumstances.1 33
This exclusion reflects the tension between trade secret protection and
employee mobility.134 This tension is greatest when an employer invokes the
"inevitable disclosure doctrine,"l35 a theory of irreparable harm that can jus-
tify injunctive relief restraining an employee from working for a competi-
tor.1 3 6 A seminal case is PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond,137 which was decided
under the Illinois enactment of the Uniform Act.138 The Illinois enactment
follows the Uniform Act in authorizing injunctive relief against "threatened
133. Id. § 8.02 cmt. e at 409.
134. Edmund W. Kitch, The Expansion of Trade Secret Protection and the Mobility
of Management Employees: A New Problem for the Law, 47 S.C. L. REV. 659,
664 (1996) ("[E]xpanded protection of trade secrecy creates tension . . . [with]
the ability of ex-employees to use their skills and knowledge in new
employment.").
135. See generally Elizabeth A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: Fair-
ness and the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
167, 182-83 (2005).
136. Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101
VA. L. REV. 317, 366-67 (2015) ("[the] inevitable disclosure [doctrine] is not a
separate cause of action"); Charles Tait Graves & James A. Diboise, Do Strict
Trade Secret and Non-Competition Laws Obstruct Innovation?, 1 EN-
TREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 323, 325-26, 337 (2007) ("The single biggest threat
to innovation under trade secret law is the so-called 'inevitable disclosure' the-
ory . . . ."). Several other authors have attributed the innovations in Silicon
Valley to California's aversion to restrictive employment covenants and the
inevitable disclosure doctrine. See generally Margo E.K. Reder & Christine
Neylon O'Brien, Managing the Risk of Trade Secret Loss Due to Job Mobility
in an Innovation Economy with the Theory of Inevitable Disclosure, 12 J. HIGH
TECH. L. 373, 440-43 (2012) ("California's Silicon Valley is now the leader in
company formation, job creation, and as a source for exports, while Boston is a
distant second.").
137. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d. 1262, 1262 (7th Cir. 1995) (Illinois
enactment).
138. Id. at 1267.
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misappropriation" without reference to the inevitable disclosure doctrine.139
The Seventh Circuit found the basis for invocation of the doctrine in prior
Illinois common law.140
The backdrop of PepsiCo was fierce beverage competition between
PepsiCo and Quaker Oats.141 In 1994, Quaker Oats' Gatorade and Snapple
brands were nationally dominant, but PepsiCo had extensive plans to in-
crease its national market share in 1995.142 In November 1994, William Red-
mond, Jr., the General Manager of PepsiCo's California Business Unit, who
had signed a confidentiality agreement, accepted an offer to become Chief
Operating Officer of Quaker Oats' combined Gatorade and Snapple opera-
tions.143 Six days after Redmond announced his resignation, PepsiCo filed
suit in Illinois federal district court to enjoin him from working for Quaker
Oats.144 On January 26, 1995, a federal district judge issued a preliminary
injunction retroactive to December 15, 1994, restraining Redmond from as-
suming a position at Quaker Oats until June of 1995 and from ever disclosing
or using PepsiCo trade secrets. 145
The trial court expressly observed that the defendants' credibility with
respect to Redmond's duties at Quaker Oats had been undermined by Red-
mond's initial false statements to PepsiCo executives denying that he had
accepted Quaker Oats' offer, Redmond's false testimony and declaration
about Quaker Oats' business plan, and Redmond's admission in his declara-
tion that his job performance at Quaker Oats could be influenced by his
knowledge of PepsiCo's secrets.1 46 In affirming, the Seventh Circuit panel
emphasized:
The district court also concluded from the evidence that Uzzi's
actions in hiring Redmond and Redmond's actions in pursuing
and accepting his new job demonstrated a lack of candor on their
139. Compare 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 1065/3(a) (LexisNexis 2010) and (2014 Supp.),
with UNIFORM ACT, supra note 7, § 2(a) & cmt.
140. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269 ("The ... [Uniform Act] mostly codifies rather than
modifies the common law doctrine that preceded it. Thus, we believe that AMP
continues to reflect the proper standard under Illinois's current statutory
scheme.").
141. Id. at 1263-64.
142. Id. at 1264.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1265.
145. Id. at 1267.
146. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, No. 94 C 6838, 1996 WL 3965, at 7 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
2, 1996) (not officially reported) (Illinois enactment).
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part and proof of their willingness to misuse PCNA trade secrets
. . . . That conclusion was not an abuse of discretion.147
Under the inevitable disclosure doctrine articulated in PepsiCo, a former
employer can enjoin a former employee that has not signed a covenant not to
compete from working for a competitor for a limited period of time.148 Al-
though a majority of states have recognized the inevitable disclosure doctrine
in some form,149 there have been impassioned rejections.150 In Whyte v.
Schlage Lock Co., for example, a California intermediate appellate court
explained:
The chief ill in the covenant not to compete imposed by the inevi-
table disclosure doctrine is its after-the-fact nature: The covenant
is imposed after the employment contract is made and therefore
alters the employment relationship without the employee's con-
sent. When, as here, a confidentiality agreement is in place, the
inevitable disclosure doctrine "in effect convert[s] the confidenti-
ality agreement into such a covenant [not to compete]."151
The Restatement of Employment Law addresses the inevitable disclo-
sure doctrine in § 8.05 dealing with competition between a former employee
and a former employer.152 The general rule is that an enforceable non-compe-
tition agreement is necessary to enjoin a former employee from competing
with a former employer. 153 However, a limited exception provides for injunc-
tive relief if the former employee either has disclosed or used specifically
identifiable trade secrets of the former employer or by words or conduct has
147. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1270-7 1. The district judge subsequently made permanent
the provisions of the preliminary injunction that had not expired. PepsiCo,
supra note 146.
148. See id. at 1269.
149. Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1460 (4th Dist. 2002)
(California enactment).
150. Id. at 1461.
151. Id. at 1462-1463; accord Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., 148
F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (Florida enactment); LeJeune v. Coin
Acceptors, Inc., 381 Md. 288, 320-22 (2004) (Maryland enactment); see also
Motion Control Sys., Inc. v. East, 262 Va. 33, 38 (2001) (Virginia enactment)
(mere knowledge of trade secrets by former employee hired by a competitor
did not justify an injunction against disclosure of the trade secrets); see also
Shannon Aaron, Note & Comment, Using the History of Noncompetition
Agreements to Guide the Future of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 17
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1191, 1193 (2013) (arguing that the courts should be
guided by the standards for the enforceability of covenants not to compete in
applying the inevitable disclosure doctrine).
152. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW, supra note 1, § 8.05.
153. Id. § 8.05(a) & cmt. b.
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threatened to do so. 154 Comment b. discusses the "demanding showing" re-
quired to justify the exception:
(1) the former and current employers are direct competitors; (2)
the employee's new position is sufficiently similar to the old posi-
tion so that (3) the employee could not fulfill the new responsibili-
ties without using or disclosing the former employer's trade
secrets; and (4) the former employee has expressly threatened
such use or disclosure, or the employee's conduct demonstrates a
pattern of deceit or misappropriation of trade secrets and other
confidential information55 indicating that ethical constraints and a
court injunction barring the disclosure or use of trade secrets
would, standing alone, be inadequate to protect the former em-
ployer's legitimate interests. Any injunction should be for . . . no
longer than necessary to prevent the new employer from gaining
an unfair advantage against the former employer. 156
The Reporters' Notes to § 8.05 state that, notwithstanding broader lan-
guage in the opinion, due to the demonstrated untrustworthiness of Red-
mond, the PepsiCo appellate decision could have been restricted to the
limited instances in which the Restatement of Employment Law permits an
injunction against competition by a former employee with knowledge of
trade secrets. 157 Moreover, Illustration 2 to § 8.05 involves E, a senior execu-
tive at X in charge of operations with broad access to trade secrets who had
signed an enforceable confidentiality agreement but not a covenant not to
compete.158 "After seven years with X, E accepted a substantially similar
senior executive position [with] Y, a competitor."159 E promptly notified X
that E would be leaving for Y, and E's employment agreement with Y states
that Y does not want E to use or to disclose X's trade secrets. 160 Under these
circumstances, a court should not enjoin E from working for Y:161 "The mere
154. Id. § 8.05(b).
155. Id. § 8.02 cmt. a (The reference to "misappropriation . . . of other confidential
information" should be disregarded. Comment a. to § 8.02 states that common-
law trade secret misappropriation" does not protect confidential information
not rising to the level of trade secret. An employer seeking to protect these
interests must do so contractually, in accordance with §§ 8.06 and 8.07."). Id.
§§ 8.06, 8.07 (Sections 8.06 and 8.07 deal with the enforceability of restrictive
employment covenants.).
156. Id. § 8.05 cmt. b.
157. Id. § 8.05.
158. RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW, supra note 1, § 8.05 cmt. b, illus. 2.
159. Id. § 8.05 cmt. b, illus. 1.
160. Id.
161. Id. § 8.05 cmt. b, illus. 2.
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fact that a high-level employee with access to confidential information62 ac-
cepts a substantially similar position at a competitor is insufficient to, in ef-
fect, impose a non-competition agreement not agreed to by the parties." 63
In sum, in addition to its exclusion of information "acquired by employ-
ees through their general experience, knowledge, training, or skills during the
ordinary course of employment" from the definition of an employer's trade
secret,164 the Restatement of Employment Law restricts the inevitable disclo-
sure doctrine as a justification for injunctive relief to instances in which there
is an enforceable covenant not to compete and instances in which there is an
enforceable covenant not to disclose trade secrets and either the conduct of
the former employee, or the new employer, or both, demonstrates the likeli-
hood that the former employee cannot be trusted to honor his or her enforcea-
ble contractual commitments.
Although the Restatement of Employment Law states that its approach
is consistent with the Uniform Act,165 the Restatement exception does not
distinguish between the positive and negative trade secrets protectable under
the Uniform Act. 166 Positive trade secrets involve information with respect to
approaches that will produce the desired result; whereas negative trade
secrets involve research dead ends and the like.167 Negative trade secrets are
more difficult to separate from an employee's general skills and knowl-
edge,168 and have less social utility than positive trade secrets. 169 A former
employee's knowledge of negative trade secrets and failure to replicate them
per se does not justify an injunction against competition.170
The definitions in the Uniform Act, the EEA, and the Restatement of
Unfair Competition do not address the distinction between trade secrets and
162. Id. § 8.05(b). The reference to confidential information should be limited to
trade secrets. See supra note 155.
163. Id. § 8.05 cmt. b, illus. 2.
164. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW, supra note 1, § 8.02(c)(3).
165. Id. § 8.05 cmt. b.
166. See id. § 8.05(b).
167. Charles Tait Graves, The Law of Negative Knowledge: A Critique, 15 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 387, 388, 393 (2007).
168. Id. at 393, 413-14 (In rare cases, it is possible that a former employee's re-
vealing only what did not work would disclose what his former employer had
discovered would work.). But see Metallurgical Indus. Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790
F.2d 1195, 1203 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Knowing what not to do often leads automat-
ically to knowing what to do.").
169. Graves, supra note 167, at 388 (a former employer should not be able to sue a
former employee who knew about the former employer's errors and did not
copy them).
170. See id. at 413.
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employee general experience, and ordinary knowledge, training, and skills.171
But it is a recurrent issue. Employee mobility is at issue whenever a former
employer asserts that a former employee has or will misappropriate trade
secrets.1 72 Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowell Co.,173 for example, was an
action under the Arkansas enactment of the Uniform Act to enjoin a former
employee from working for a competitor.174 The Arkansas Supreme Court
affirmed the denial of relief.175 At best, the former employee had minimal
knowledge of his former employer's trade secrets and his new employer had
forbidden other employees from consulting him about his prior employ-
ment. 176 The court added, "[O]ne who has worked in a particular field cannot
be compelled to erase from his mind, all of the general skills, knowledge and
expertise acquired through his experience."177 If a former employer's action
against a competitor that is hiring former employees is premised upon the
former employees' misappropriation of trade secrets, employee mobility is
also at stake.178 In Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network,179
for example, Metro had contracted with radio stations to gather and to broad-
cast traffic information.180 Metro's contract with station KFWB was not re-
newed.181 When the KFWB contract was awarded to Shadow Traffic
Network, a competitor of Metro's, Metro sought a preliminary injunction
restraining Shadow from soliciting and employing the Metro employees that
had been assigned to KFWB.182 Metro claimed that Shadow intended to mis-
appropriate trade secrets that Metro had acquired while performing the
KFWB contract. 183 But a California intermediate appellate court affirmed the
trial court's denial of a preliminary injunction under the California enactment
of the Uniform Act.184 The court held, "[tihe vague and generalized descrip-
171. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B); UNIFORM AcT, supra note 7, § 1; RESTATEMENT
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 1, § 39.
172. See Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowell Co., 994 S.W.2d 468, 468, 470 (1999)
(Arkansas enactment).
173. Id. at 468.
174. Id. at 469.
175. Id. at 475.
176. Id. at 474.
177. Id. at 475.
178. See Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 22 Cal. App. 4th
853, 853-55 (2d Dist. 1994) (California enactment).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 853-55.
181. Id. at 856.
182. Id. at 853-56.
183. Id. at 858.
184. Metro, 22 Cal. App. 4th at 853-55.
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tion of Metro's 'trade secrets' is nothing more than a 'job classification' for
radio traffic announcers. It fails to describe any body of information indepen-
dent of the ability of its employees to satisfy KFWB's requirements."185
Comment d. to Restatement of Unfair Competition § 42 deals with
breach of confidence by employees. It contains an extensive discussion of the
importance of distinguishing employees' general skill, knowledge, training,
and experience from an employer's trade secrets in order to maintain a rea-
sonable balance between the protection of information and employee mobil-
ity.186 A preliminary version of the EEA similarly provided, "[t]he term
[proprietary economic information]187 does not include any knowledge, expe-
rience, training, or skill that a person lawfully has acquired due to his work
as an employee of or as an independent contractor for any person."188 Al-
though this provision does not appear in the enacted EEA, the EEA's legisla-
tive sponsors placed a Managers' Statement in the Congressional Record
stating that the deletion was not intended to subject employee general knowl-
edge, experience, and skill to criminal liability.189
In addition to its definition of employer's trade secret and its limitation
of the inevitable disclosure doctrine, the Restatement of Employment Law
proposes a new theory for protection of an employer's trade secrets. The
Restatement states that employees breach their duty of loyalty to their em-
ployer by unauthorized disclosure or use of the employer's trade secrets even
after the employment relationship has terminated.190 This approach has been
described as both unnecessary in view of existing remedies for trade secret
misappropriation and without case support. 19 1 Indeed, the Restatement of
185. Id. at 862-63.
186. RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 1, § 42 cmt. d.
187. S. REP. No. 104-359, at 2 (1996).
188. Id.
189. 142 Cong. Rec. at S 12213 (1996) (Statement of the Managers of the Economic
Espionage Bill) ("A prosecution that attempts to tie skill and experience to a
particular trade secret should not succeed unless it can show that the particular
material was stolen or misappropriated. Thus, the government cannot prosecute
an individual for taking advantage of the general knowledge and skills or expe-
rience that he or she obtains or comes by during his tenure with a company.");
see also Pooley et al., Understanding the EEA, supra note 105, at 189-90.
("[There are] repeated statements in the legislative history indicating that for-
mer employees should not be punished under the EEA merely for taking with
them the general skill, knowledge, and industry experience they have acquired
on the job.").
190. RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW, supra note 1, §§ 8.01(b)(1), 8.03(a), (c).
191. Michael Selmi, Trending and the Restatement of Employment Law's Provisions
on Employee Mobility, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1369, 1373 (2015) ("There is,
after all, a separate cause of action for misappropriation of trade secrets, and
there is no logical reason to create an additional cause of action grounded in the
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Employment Law acknowledges that its expansion of the duty of loyalty
could be important only in jurisdictions that have not enacted the Official
Text of the Uniform Act, which preempts duplicative tort and equitable theo-
ries of relief.192
What the Restatement of Employment Law adds to the treatment of em-
ployee mobility issues is the suggestion that a plaintiff former employer
should have the affirmative burden of showing that its trade secret claims do
not unnecessarily restrict its former employees' exercise of their general ex-
perience and ordinary knowledge, training, and skills. In states in which this
allocation of the burden of proof to a former employer has not been made,
the Restatement of Employment Law should influence its adoption.
Allocation of this burden of proof to a former employer is consistent
with the Uniform Act. A former employer that asserts rights in information
against a former employee must prove the existence of the rights.193
duty of loyalty . . . . I am not aware of any case, or more importantly any body
of case law that seeks to protect trade secrets through the duty-of-loyalty cause
of action."). The Restatement of Unfair Competition emphasized existing em-
ployees' duty of loyalty with respect to trade secrets. RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION, supra note 1, § 42 cmt. b at 480 ("The rules governing liability
for the appropriation of trade secrets play a more central role in regulating the
behavior of employees after the termination of the employment relationship.").
192. RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW, supra note 1, § 8.02 cmt. a at 424 ("In a jurisdic-
tion that has not adopted the UTSA with its rule of preemption, employers
injured by a violation of the employee's duty of loyalty stated in this Section
would have an action for appropriate relief . . . ."). The Restatement of Employ-
ment Law's proposed expansion of the employee duty of loyalty to include
trade secret misappropriation is preempted by the Uniform Act. See UNIFORM
ACT, supra note 7, § 7(a). See Dole, supra note 15, at 106-07. Accordingly, the
principal jurisdictions that could consider following the Restatement of Em-
ployment law are Massachusetts, North Carolina, and New York, which have
not adopted the Uniform Act, refer to the authority in supra note 10, and Iowa,
Nebraska, and New Mexico, which failed to enact the Uniform Act preemption
provision. See Dole, supra note 15, at 99. Because the definition of trade secret
was not altered by the 1985 Official Amendments to the Uniform Act and the
Restatement of Employment Law definition of trade secret approximates that
of the Uniform Act, the 1985 Official Amendments to the Uniform Act pre-
emption provision and the split of judicial authority with respect to the scope of
Uniform Act preemption will not increase the number of states in which the
Restatement's proposed expansion of the duty of loyalty is not preempted. See
generally Dole, supra note 15.
193. See Lemley, IP Rights, supra note 25, at 342 ("The UTSA . .. defines the legal
rights of trade secret owners by requiring the existence of a secret and defining
what constitutes a secret. Doing so prevents plaintiffs from ignoring or glossing
over proof of the existence of a trade secret in their effort to prevent what they
see as improper use of their information."); see also RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION, supra note 1, § 42, cmt. d at 481 ("An employer who is asserting
rights in information against a former employee bears the burden of proving the
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VI. THE NAFTA AGREEMENT, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, AND
THE PROPOSED EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVE
Article 1711(1) of the NAFTA Agreement commits the United States,
Canada, and Mexico to:
provide the legal means for any persons to prevent trade secrets
from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without
the consent of the person lawfully in control of the information in
a manner contrary to honest commercial practices, in so far as:
(a) the information is secret in the sense that it is not, as a
body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its
components, generally known among or readily accessi-
ble to persons that normally deal with the kind of infor-
mation in question;
(b) the information has actual or potential commercial value
because it is secret; and
(c) the person lawfully in control of the information has
taken reasonable steps under the circumstances to keep it
secret. 194
With an important exception, this definition is virtually identical to the Uni-
form Act definition.195
The NAFIA Agreement restricts the generally known and readily ac-
cessible by proper means limitations upon the protection of information to
general knowledge of and ready access to the entirety of the secret informa-
tion either as a body or in its precise configuration and assembly. There is
sufficient secrecy "if only the assembly of the components of the information
is secret."1 96 This artificial restriction upon the generally known and readily
existence and ownership of a trade secret."). To the extent that a plaintiff for-
mer employer does not prove objectively that specific information is a trade
secret (refer to supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text), the information can
be regarded to be an aspect of the former employee's general experience or
ordinary knowledge, training and skills. See Charles Tait Graves, Trade Secrets
as Property: Theory and Consequences, 15 J. INTELL. PRop. L. 39, 53 (2007)
("[E]verything the employee [sic.] cannot prove to be secret may well be
deemed general skills, knowledge, and experience.").
194. NAFTA Agreement, art. 1711, supra note 2.
195. POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 35, § 15.02 ("Trade secrets are defined
under NAFTA in terms virtually identical to the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act .... ).
196. See Mira Burri & Ingo Meitinger, The Protection of Undisclosed Information:
Commentary of Article 39 TRIPS, at 2, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK
(May 20, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2439180 [hereinafter Burri & Meit-
inger] (commentary on identical language in the TRIPs Agreement).
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accessible by proper means limitationsl97 may have been intended to protect
database owners.1 98
Annex 1 C of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT
Agreement) of April 15, 1994 that established the World Trade Organization,
is captioned Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Law and known
as the TRIPs Agreement.1 99 Unlike the NAFTA Agreement, the TRIPs
Agreement refers to trade secrets as "undisclosed information."200 Article 39
of the TRIPs Agreement provides in relevant part:
SECTION 7: PROTECTION OF UNDISCLOSED
INFORMATION
Article 39
1. In the course of ensuring effective protection against un-
fair competition as provided in Article 10bis of the Paris
Convention (1967), Members shall protect undisclosed
information is accordance with paragraph 2 ....
2. Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of
preventing information lawfully within their control
from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others
without their consent in a manner contrary to honest
commercial practices so long as such information:
(a) Is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the
precise configuration and assembly of its compo-
nents, generally known among or readily accessible
to persons within the circles that normally deal with
the kind of information in question;
197. See, e.g., Wright Med. Tech., Inc. v. Grisoni, 135 S.W.3d 561, 591-94 (Tenn.
App. 2002) (affirming the dissolution of a temporary injunction prohibiting the
manufacture and marketing of a medical device by a former employee where a
"majority" of the information sought to be protected was publically available);
Lake Treasure Holdings, Ltd v. Foundry Hill GP LLC, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L.
939, 962 (2015) (unreported case) ("The defendants' expert explained convinc-
ingly at trial that the Chess Champions primarily comprised components taken
from the public domain. He further explained that the arrangements of the pub-
lic elements in the Chess Champions were elementary, even simplistic, and that
similar arrangements are widely discussed in publically available literature and
on the internet.").
198. See Burri & Meitinger, supra note 196, at 2 (In discussing this language in the
TRIPs Agreement, the authors commented: "This means, for example, that se-
cret databases are also protected under art. 39, even when they encompass en-
tries earlier disclosed."). Databases have limited protection under American
trade secret law. See generally Sharon K. Sandeen, A Contract by Any Other
Name Is Still a Contract: Examining the Effectiveness of Trade Secret Clauses
to Protect Databases, 45 IDEA 119 (2005).
199. POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 35, § 15.02.
200. TRIPs Agreement, art. 39, supra note 3, ¶¶ 1, 2.
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(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the cir-
cumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the
information, to keep it secret. 201
Like Article 1711(1) of the NAFTA Agreement, Article 39 of the TRIPs
Agreement was influenced by the Uniform Act definition of trade secret. 202
But, whereas Article 1711(1) of the NAFTA Agreement refers to information
with "actual or potential" value. Article 39(2)(b) refers only to information
with "value." Unlike the NAFTA Agreement, the TRIPs Agreement does not
clearly obligate its signatories to protect potentially-valuable information in-
volving yet-to-be commercialized trade secrets. 203 Also, the TRIPs Agree-
ment, like the NAFTA Agreement,204 artificially restricts the "generally
known" and "readily accessible by proper means" limitations upon protection
to general knowledge of and ready access to the entirety of information and
its precise configuration and assembly.205
A European Union Directive is an act of the European Parliament and
Council requiring Member States to incorporate the Directive's mandatory
provisions into domestic law by a deadline,206 which, in the case of the pro-
posed Trade Secrets Directive, is twenty-four months after its adoption.207
The proposed Directive, which is captioned a Directive on "protection of
undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets)," contains
the following definition of "trade secret":
[I]nformation which meets all of the following requirements:
201. Id.
202. Sharon K. Sandeen, The Limits of Trade Secret Law: Article 39 of the TRIPS
Agreement and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act On Which It Is Based, in TRADE
SECRETS AND UNDISCLOSED INFORMATION 797 at 815 (Sharon K. Sandeen &
Elizabeth A. Rowe eds., 2014) ("The secrecy limitation of trade secret law is
built into the TRIPs Agreement by virtue of Article 39(2) which adopted,
nearly verbatim, the UTSA's definition of a trade secret ... . However, Article
39 includes a restriction on the application of the generally known and readily
accessible limitations that is not in the text of the UTSA. Specifically such
limitations apply only to information that is available 'as a body or in the pre-
cise configuration and assembly of its components."').
203. POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 35, § 15.02. James Pooley added that:
"[I]t would significantly diminish the minimum level of protection required by
the treaty if the wording of this section were to be interpreted too narrowly." Id.
204. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 194-198, 201 and accompanying text.
206. Jacqueline D. Lipton, Wikipedia and the European Union Database Directive,
26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 631, 636 (2010).
207. Proposed EU Directive, supra note 4, art. 18.
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(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the
precise configuration and assembly of its components,
generally known among or readily accessible to persons
within circles that normally deal with the kind of infor-
mation in question;
(b) has commercial value because it is secret;
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circum-
stances, by the person lawfully in control of the informa-
tion, to keep it secret.208
This definition follows the definition of "undisclosed information" in the
TRIPs Agreement20 9 and contains the same weaknesses. Protection is not
clearly extended to information with potential value that otherwise satisfies
the requirements and the existence of general knowledge of and ready access
by proper means to information is restricted artificially.210
The NAFIA Agreement, the TRIPs Agreement, and the proposed Euro-
pean Union Directive are important international developments that have and
will increase national protection of trade secrets. 211 But their definitions of
trade secret are too imprecise to influence change in prevailing American
conceptions. The proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement also will in-
clude intellectual property coverage.2 12 It is doubtful, however, that its treat-
ment of trade secrets will be more precise.
208. Id. art. 2(1).
209. See id. at Explanatory Memorandum.
210. Compare Proposed EU Directive, supra note 4 and text accompanying foot-
note 208, with supra notes 200-205 and accompanying text.
211. Mexico, for example, amended its laws prior to the finalization of the NAFTA
Agreement. POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 35, § 15.02. But, although
the TRIPs Agreement requires procedural protection of intellectual property
rights and judicial authority to impose sanctions, the TRIPs Agreement does
not require vigorous enforcement or the imposition of meaningful sanctions.
Rachel Brewster, The Surprising Benefits to Developing Countries of Linking
International Trade and Intellectual Property, 12 CHi. J. INT'L L. 1, 34-35
(2011). But see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Trade Secrets: How Well Should
We Be Allowed to Hide Them? The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 9 FORD-
HAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 26-29 (1998) (Although the EEA
can be violated by certain conduct occurring outside the U.S., it could violate
the TRIPs Agreement to apply the EEA to conduct in a developing nation
given a transition period to comply with the agreement.).
212. Ruth L. Okediji, Legal Innovation in International Intellectual Property Rela-
tions: Revisiting Twenty-One Years of the Trips Agreement, 36 U. PA. J. INT'L
L. 191, 257-59 (2014).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Except in Nebraska,213 non-uniform amendments have not seriously im-
paired the Uniform Act's definition of trade secret.2 14 The Economic Espio-
nage Act, the NAFTA Agreement, the TRIPs Agreement, and the proposed
European Union Directive offer no suggestions for improvement.215 Al-
though the Restatement of Unfair Competition suggests that referring to "in-
dependent" economic value is unnecessary, 2 16 the reference does not appear
to have caused problems. Finally, the Restatement of Employment Law sug-
gests that the courts in every state, including states that have enacted the
Uniform Act, should require a former employer charging a former employee
with misappropriation of trade secrets to prove that the relief sought does not
unnecessarily restrict the employee's exercise of his or her general experi-
ence and ordinary knowledge, training, and skills,217 a burden that should
include proof that any threatened misappropriation involves positive rather
than merely negative trade secrets. 2 18
213. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 41-45, 50-62, 74-78 and accompanying text.
215. Refer to supra notes 82-118, 194-212 and accompanying text.
216. Refer to supra note 119 and accompanying text. Colorado and Illinois non-
uniform amendments deleted "independent." COLo. REv. STAT. § 7-74-102(4)
(2013); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1065 / 2(d)(1) (LexisNexis 2010) & (2014
Supp.).
217. Refer to the text following supra note 192. This allocation of the burden of
proof to a plaintiff employer is consistent with the Uniform Act. Refer to supra
note 193 and accompanying text.
218. Refer to supra notes 165-170 and accompanying text.
2016] 123

